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EXPLORATION	MISSIONS	ARE	RISKY TECHNOLOGY	DEVELOPMENT	IS	RISKY
RISK	IS	INTENTIONAL	INTERACTION	WITH	UNCERTAINTY	[1]
Neerim
• Exploration is venturing into unknown environment
• Unknown is uncertain
• NASA’s Policy on Mission Assurance [3]
• Accept residual risk
• Remaining risk that exists after all mitigation
actions have been implemented or exhausted
in accordance with the risk management
process
QUALITY	OF	DEMONSTRATION	
AND	ENVIRONMENT QUALITY OF PROTOTYPE
• Development means creating new behavior
• New is uncertain
• NASA’s Systems Engineering Handbook [4]
• Technology infusion is
• Very complex process
• Ad hoc approaches for different projects
have varying degrees of success
• Failure contributors are related to level of
uncertainty at project inception
NEW	FRONTIERS
ANNOUNCEMENT	OF	OPPORTUNITY	[2]
• No target is specified for mission residual risk
• Limited number of less mature technologies and/or
advanced engineering developments are permitted
• Must contain a plan for maturing systems to TRL
6 … by no later than Preliminary Design Review
(PDR)
• Proposers will likely concentrate on technology risk
vs mission residual risk
TRL	6	CAN	CORRESPOND	TO	A	WIDE	RANGE	OF	MISSION	RISK
System/subsystem	model	or	prototype	demonstration	
in	a	relevant	environment	(ground	or	space)
• Nominal	vs	bounding	loads
• Confirming	success	vs	
exploring	failure
• Individual	loads	vs	combined	
loading
• Scale	of	test	article
• Gap	between	demonstration	
environment	and	operational	
environment
• Thermal	Protection	
System	cannot	test	in	fully	
relevant	environment
• Single	demonstration	vs	
statistically	relevant	data	set
• Pass/fail	vs	model	correlation
• Attack	Unknown	and	Under-
Appreciated	Risk	[5]
• Likely	a	factor	of	2-5	
higher	than	estimated	risk	
at	start	of	system	
operation
• Affected	by
• Pace	of	development
• Prioritization	of	safety	
vs	cost	and	schedule
• Who	built	it?
• Technologist	vs	industry
• Experienced	personnel		
available	for	flight	build?
• Same	manufacturing	
infrastructure	for	flight	
build?
• When	was	it	built?
• Obsolescence	of	
components	or	processes	[7]
• Are	the	processes	mature	and	
repeatable?
• Verification	and	acceptance	
criteria
• Are	there	raw	material	
procurement	issues?
• Is	the	supply	chain	complex?
• Sole	source	or	intellectual	
property	issues?
• Any	scale	changes	required	for	
flight?
RECOMMENDATIONS	FOR	MISSION	RESIDUAL	RISK	REDUCTION
A. Assign	reliability	goal	for	system	in	Announcement	of	
Opportunity	[9]
• Facilitates	comparison	of	Expected	Value	from	
competing	mission	proposals
• Proposers	can	allocate	reliability	requirements	to	
subsystems
• Balance	new	technology	reliability	against	
capability	of	other	subsystems
B. Assess	reliability	of	subsystems	and	integrated	system
• Avoid	costly	reliability	improvement	for	subsystems	
that	do	not	drive	integrated	mission	risk	[10]
• Search	for	unanticipated	failure	modes
• Drive	down	Unknown	Risks	[5]
• Concentrate	on	failure	modes	that	dominate	risk	[11]
• Monitor	remaining	opportunity	for	reliability	growth
C. Provide	flexibility	for	TRL	advances	in	mission	
development	schedule
• Different	technologies	have	different	design	cycle	
duration
• Short	cycle	time	permits	later	design	freeze	in	
mission	development	timeline
• Technology	already	transferred	to	industry	can	
have	shorter	delivery	schedule
• New	technologies	are	likely	early	in	the	reliability	
growth	curve
• Expect	significant	reliability	improvement	from	an	
additional	design	cycle
D. Test	hard
• Develop	insight	into	technology	capability	limits
• Vary	test	environments	to	assess	sensitivity	of	
response
• Collect	data	to	validate	predictive	models
• Study	failure	phenomenology,	including	precursors	
[12]
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Reliability	growth	[8]	is	improvement	in	reliability	over		
time	due	to	corrective	actions	to	system	design,	
operation…	or	the	associated	manufacturing	process
A B
C
D
improvements	in	reliability	
due	to	corrective	actions	
Extreme	environment	testing	
of	acreage	material
Investigation	of	adhesive	
types	and	thicknesses
High	shear	testing	of	
complete	seam
Combined	thermal	and	
mechanical	loading	of	seams
Example:	HEEET	TPS	[6] Example:	HEEET	TPS	[6]
Component
Seam	assembly
Seam	interfaces
Assembly
Complete	heatshield
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